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Abstract 
 
 
During the first half of the 1930’s, the founders of the Chicago School of 
economics and John Maynard Keynes in England advocated public works and as a 
cure for unemployment and a way to overcome the Great Depression. Counter 
cyclical fiscal policy was seen as a feasible strategy to attenuate the phases of the 
economic cycle. The quantity theory of money coupled with the hypothesis of wage 
and price rigidity provided the theoretical underpinnings for this policy proposal. 
These economists argued that a m onetary policy channeled through the banking 
system was ineffective. In particular, Chicago economists identified two key 
features that exemplified this restriction: the instability of the circulation velocity of 
money and the fragility and underdevelopment of the banking system and financial 
structure. Fiscal policy was thus advocated on the basis of market rigidities and the 
impotency of monetary policy.  
By the end of the decade both Chicago economists and Keynes had departed 
from this fiscal policy stance. The former became concerned with the inflationary 
consequences of expansionary fiscal policies, especially when there was the 
temptation to implement them pro cyclically. Ultimately, fiscal issues were 
overshadowed by monetary policy concerns.  
Keynes remained an advocate of counter cyclical fiscal policy but recanted 
from the instruments he had proposed earlier to combat economic fluctuations. 
Using the framework he developed in the General Theory (1936), he extended the 
division of income (consumption) and non-income (investment) related categories 
to the government’s budget. Thus, Keynes distinguished between a current 
(government consumption) and a capital (government investment) budget.  The 
current budget was to be balanced or show a surplus to finance the capital budget, 
which in turn played the fundamental stabilizing role.  
This allowed him to advance two different concepts of fiscal policy, capital 
and deficit budgeting. Capital budgeting, to which he adhered under the assumption 
of capital scarcity, meant rejecting the short-term stabilization tools associated with 
deficit budgeting (public works and the use of taxation to alter consumption 
patterns). Once the capital saturation point was reached fiscal policy could change 
its focus from investment to consumption and perhaps from capital to deficit 
budgeting. 
 
1. Introduction 
                                                                 
1 Economic Affairs Officer, ECLAC, Mexico City. The opinions herein expressed are those of the author and 
may not coincide with those of the organization to which he is affiliated. Thanks are due to Nancy Hope and 
Juan Carlos Moreno Brid for comments and suggestions, and to Clifford Hope Jr. for useful bibliography on 
William Bryan Jennings and Coxey’s Army.   2 
During the early 1930’s both Keynes and the Chicago economists advanced a policy of 
public works as a way to overcome depressions.
2 They argued in favor of a counter cyclical 
fiscal policy to dampen variations over the phases of the economic cycle. Chicago 
economists drew on a historical tradition that linked monetary and real variables and their 
point of view applied to a broad range of scenarios.  
Keynes’s case for public w orks was developed initially to overcome the limitations 
imposed by laissez faire economic policies and was later seen to be applicable to a ‘special 
case’, that of a gold standard exchange rate regime. Ultimately, it became a way of showing 
how autonomous expenditures can increase income, rather than prices, under less than full 
employment conditions. 
 
The theory and assumptions underlying both strands of thought were remarkably 
similar. Both adhered to some version of the quantity theory of money. In addition these 
economists thought that wages and, in general, costs of production were rigid and that the 
banking system and monetary policy tools were unsuitable for the task of stabilizing the 
economy. Chicago economists, in particular, viewed the instability of velocity and/or the 
fragility and underdevelopment of the banking system as an important limitation on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Due to the impracticability of reducing costs they 
advocated an expansionary economic policy through fiscal means that could restore the 
level of profitability. The primacy of fiscal over monetary policy emanated thus from a 
combination of market imperfections coupled with important restrictions on the potency of 
monetary policy channeled via the banking system. Finally, Keynes and at least two of the 
Chicago economist here considered (Paul Douglas and Aaron Director) justified the impact 
of public spending on the level of output by having recourse to Kahn’s multiplier. 
 
Both Chicago economists and Keynes eventually abandoned the idea of reflationary 
policies as a fundamental stabilization tool, but for reasons that were diametrically 
opposite. The former took the theoretical foundations of the quantity theory to its full 
development and became concerned with the inflationary dangers associated with a fiscal 
expansion. Moreover, in the absence of well-defined fiscal rules, expansionary policies 
could well be used pro rather than counter cyclically fueling thus an inflationary process.  
 
Over time, as the belief that the economy operated close to full employment levels of 
output gained prominence among Chicago economists and their followers, fiscal policy lost 
its relevance. In fact, it became relegated to “a technique for the exercise of monetary 
policy”.
3   
 
For Keynes the development of the theory of effective demand meant the abandonment 
of the quantity theory of money as well as imperfectionist arguments to explain 
unemployment. As a result, his earlier proposals for fiscal expansion lost their theoretical 
basis.  
 
Instead, Keynes extended the logic of the separation of expenditure categories of  The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) (GT, hereafter) to include the 
                                                                 
2 See, Davis (1968) , Friedman (1984) and Tavlas(1997). 
3 See, Warburton ([1945-56], (1966)), p. 237.   3 
government and fiscal policy in his analysis. In the same way that he separated these 
categories into an income dependent category (consumption) and an income independent 
expenditure category (investment), he distinguished between a current  (government 
consumption) and a capital budget (investment).  
 
Within this framework the current budget was to be in equilibrium, or show a surplus, 
to finance the expenditures of the capital budget which played the stabilizing role over the 
economic cycle. For Keynes, capital budgeting was a fiscal strategy aimed at maintaining 
economic equilibrium r ather than curing disequilibrium (i.e., deficit budgeting). On this 
ground he opposed a policy of public works and the use of taxation to change the patterns 
of consumption in the short run while favoring the use of automatic fiscal stabilizers and, 
especially, capital expenditures to compensate cyclical fluctuations. 
 
Keynes’s fiscal policy views were elaborated under a key assumption of the GT, that of 
capital scarcity. As long as the stock of capital was inadequate any increase in investment 
would yield a positive return and be beneficial to the welfare of society. Once the point of 
capital saturation was reached investment would be wasteful and thus unnecessary. At this 
juncture fiscal policy would change its focus from the regulation of investment to that of 
consumption. 
 
This paper is divided into five parts. The first describes the historical connection 
between Chicago economists, the quantity theory and fiscal policy. The second analyzes the 
early Chicago view on the business cycle and monetary and fiscal policy. The third 
provides a summary of the evolution of Keynes’s thought on public works, deficit spending 
and counter cyclical fiscal policy in general. The last two sections examine Keynes’s 
thought on these fiscal issues prior to and following the publication of the GT.  
 
 
2.  Chicago economists, the quantity theory of money and public works: the historical 
connection 
During the 1930’s the Chicago economists using a quantity theory framework, argued 
in favor of a counter cyclical fiscal policy to attenuate the oscillations of the business cycle. 
At the same time, they pointed to the limitations of using monetary policy for stabilization 
purposes. While their policy stance had a “Keynesian” flavor, and contradicted some of the 
basic postulates of the latter Chicago School of economics, it was founded upon a long 
standing tradition linking monetary and real variables whose origins can be traced to the 
colonial period. 
   
In colonial America, the belief that money supply could not only stimulate prices but 
also business conditions was common and widely shared. The “Want of some proper 
medium for Currency” motive was voiced early on in the eastern part of the colonies as a 
way to guard against recessions and unemployment.
4 This belief expanded to the West and 
                                                                 
4 See Davis ([1900], (2000))  for an analysis of the currency in Massachusetts Bay in 1690. In his 1721 
pamphlet Francis Rawles recommended the use of paper money to stimulate the Pennsylvanian economy. 
Similar views were expressed by Benjamin Franklin (1729): “A plentiful currency will occasion the Trading 
Produce to bear a good price: Because Trade being encouraged and advanced by it, there will be a much 
greater demand for that produce; which will be a great Encouragement of Husbandry.”    4 
eventually found one of its most renowned supporters in the figure of William Bryan 
Jennings (1860-1925) and the Populist movement.  
 
  Following the 1893 recession, and using the quantity theory as their theoretical 
framework Populists and Bryan recommended increasing the money supply by means of 
the free coinage of silver to increase prices and improve business conditions.
5 As well they 
advocated government spending in public works as a remedy for unemployment. 
 
  The populists were not alone in their beliefs. Jacob Sechler Coxey, who lent his 
name to the march of the unemployed to Washington in 1893 (“Coxey’s Army”), proposed 
two bills which included the issuance for large issues of legal tender currency to be spent 
for roads and other public works for the relief of the homeless.
 6  
 
  Bryan and the populists came to be considered monetary cranks
7 and were eschewed 
and rejected by prominent economists such as Irving Fisher (1867-1947) who fought to re-
establish the reputation of the quantity theory as a sound theoretical and empirical basis for 
the understanding of price movements. As he put it: 
 
“…the ‘quantity theory’ has become the subject of political dispute, it has lost 
prestige and has even come to be regarded by many as an exploded fallacy. The 
attempts by promoters of unsound money to make improper use of the quantity 
theory –as in the first Bryan campaign- led many sound money men to the utter 
repudiation of the quantity theory. The consequence has been that especially in 
America, the quantity theory needs to be reintroduced into general knowledge.”
8 
 
Fisher’s restatement of the quantity theory served as a general framework for its further use 
and development by Chicago economists such as Aaron Director and Paul Douglas (1892-
1976), Frank Knight (1885-1972), Henry Simons (1899-1946) and Jacob Viner (1892-
1970).
9 However, following pre-Fisherian tradition and without bringing into disrepute the 
quantity theory tradition these economists were led during the Great Depression to advocate 
public works and government spending to revamp the stagnant economy.  
 
Three premises formed the basis for their policy recommendations. First, depressions 
arose from a lack of synchronization between prices and costs, or more precisely between 
the supply and demand prices. Second, costs were difficult to change due to downward 
sticky wages. Third monetary policy was ineffective. Either the institutional configuration 
                                                                 
5 See, Koenig (1971) p. 82 and p. 253. 
6Ibid.  pp. 217 and 138 and Concise Dictionary of American History (1962) pp.260-261. 
7 See Hofstadter ([1948], (1973)), p. 245 and Goowyn (1978), p.217. But see Koenig, op.cit. pp. 80 and 119 
for an opposite opinion.  
8 Fisher ([1911], (1985)), p.viii. 
9 Knight, Viner and Simons are considered the founders of the “Chicago School” of economics. However, as 
Viner wrote, in a letter to Don Patinkin in 1981, he became aware of the tenents of the Chicago school and its 
label after he left the university in 1946 and adopted that label in 1951: “It was after I left Chicago in 1946 
that I began to hear rumors about a ‘Chicago School’ which was engaged in organized battle for laissez faire 
and ‘quantity theory of money’ a nd against ‘imperfect competition’ theorizing and ‘Keynesianism’. I 
remained skeptical about this until I attended a conference sponsored by University of Chicago professors in 
1951” (Reder, (1982), p. 7. Footnote 19).   5 
of the financial system was inadequate, the monetary policy instruments useless, or velocity 
(the demand for money) was unstable, and thus changes in the money supply would not 
necessarily have, per se, a predictable effect on prices. The logical conclusion was that 
fiscal policy was the main tool to bring about an economic recovery. 
 
 
3.  Chicago economists, the business cycle and fiscal policy 
The Chicago approach to the business cycle is aptly summarized by Simons ([1934], 
(1962), p. 55):  
 
“When for any reason business earnings become abnormally favorable, bank credit 
expands, driving sensitive product prices farther out of line with sticky, insensitive 
costs; earnings become more favorable; credit expands farther and more rapidly; 
and so on and on, until costs finally do catch up, or until some speculative flurry 
happens to reverse the initial maladjustment. When  earnings prospects are 
unpromising, credit contracts and earnings become still smaller and more 
unpromising. In an economy where costs (especially wages, freight rates, and 
monopoly prices in basic industries) are extremely inflexible downward, the 
deflation might continue indefinitely...”  
 
 
According to this view, the triggering factor of changes in the business cycles were 
entrepreneurs’ profits or losses accompanied by a credit expansion (contraction) and a 
disparity between prices of final goods and costs. The initial determinants of profits are not 
identified with precision at the start of an economic expansion, but the reference to 
“speculative flurry” placed expectations in the role of a key variable in the downturn phase 
of the economic cycle. The upward or downward movement of the cycle was amplified by 
the banking system.  Finally, the misalignment between prices and a downward rigid cost 
structure perpetuated the conditions for an economic boom and paved the way for a 
depression. 
 
  All of these elements with different emphasis and degrees of importance were 
present in the Chicago explanation of the Great Depression. Their distrust of the banking 
system, their perception of an underdeveloped financial structure and the explicit 
recognition by some of the instability of the circulation velocity of money, led them to 
advocate fiscal policy as a means to overcome economic depressions. More generally, these 
authors favored counter cyclical fiscal policy as a way to attenuate economic fluctuations. 
The recourse to fiscal policy emanated from the limitations, which they bestowed upon the 
workings of the monetary system and monetary policy.  
 
  Frank Knight and Henry Simons identified expectations and the behavior of the 
circulation velocity of money as triggering factors of the Great Depression while Paul 
Douglas and Aaron Director focused on wage and price stickiness combined with a lack of 
consumer purchasing power as both triggering and propagating mechanisms. 
 
  Frank Knight ([1941], (1963)) analyzed the business cycle in terms of the behavior 
of the speculative demand for money combined with lags in the output of final products.   6 
Velocity or the demand for real cash balances was determined by the speculative demand 
for money rather than by transaction purposes. In turn, speculative demand for money 
responded to the holding of idle money in the expectation of a rise in its future value. It was 
ultimately expectations that determined the demand for real goods and which could ignite 
an upward or downwards cumulative movement. As put by Knight (p.211): 
 
“ Thus the tendency for increase or decrease in speculative holding of money…to 
feed upon itself cumulatively is subject to no such effective check as results from 
the accumulation of a consumable commodity with a fairly definite demand curve 
which is fairly well known, like the stock held speculatively. Indeed in the case of 
money, just what sets a boundary to a movement of general prices in either 
direction, and especially the downward movement, becomes something of a 
mystery.” 
 
The prevailing structure of the banking system was an important factor in amplifying 
changes in hoarding and dishoarding (i.e., in the velocity of money). According to Simons, 
low capitalization levels characterized the banking system. In  addition, the practice of 
making short term loans representing unsecured claims led to the creation of money 
substitutes, increasing thus the variability of the circulation velocity of money. 
10 
 
The existing financial structure generated the conditions for wholesale liquidation as banks 
were led to curtail loans when faced with unfavorable business conditions. Banks were 
forced to hoard and liquidate existing loans while individuals converted deposits into 
currency. In short, according to Simons (1933), the “speculative temper of the community” 
caused changes in velocity, which were magnified by the existing short term banking 
lending structure of the economy.
11 Indeed (([1936], (1962), p.166)),  
 
“…the economy becomes exposed to catastrophic disturbances as soon as short term 
borrowing develops on a large scale. No real stability of production and 
employment is possible when short-term lenders are continuously in a position to 
demand conversion of their investments, amounting in the aggregate to a large 
multiple of the total available circulating media, into such media. Such an economy 
is workable only on the basis of a utopian flexibility of prices and wage-rates. Short-
term obligations provide abundant money substitutes during booms, thus releasing 
money from cash reserves; and they precipitate hopeless efforts at liquidation during 
depressions. The shorter the period of money contracts, the more unstable the 
economy will be…”
12 
 
  Paul Douglas (1935) was also aware that the banking system was prone to generate 
instability. Indeed, three features of the banking system tended to aggravate rather than to 
                                                                 
10 The difference between Knight and Simons centered on the way expectations affected velocity, which in 
turn reflected the historical context in which they were writing. For the former expectations led to hoarding or 
dishoarding due to expected price variations. For the latter, velocity responded to collapses in confidence.  
11 See, Simons, Appendix to Banking and Currency Reform (1933), quoted in Friedman ([1967], (1969)), 
p.85. 
12 In a similar way, he stated ([1934], (1962), p.54): “It is no exaggeration to say that the major proximate 
factor in the present crisis is the commercial banking system”.    7 
dampen fluctuations in economic activity: the deposit multiplier, the volatility of credit 
upon the demand for capital goods and the fractional reserve banking.  
 
The deposit multiplier tended to aggravate cyclical phases, depending on its phase, 
by causing a cumulative contraction or expansion of credit. Finally, a fractional reserve 
system could set the basis for a banking panic:  
 
“The bankers have in the past taken heart by assuring themselves that this could 
never happen, since people would continue to have confidence in the banks and 
would never put the credit system to the test. But what was thought to be merely an 
impossible nightmare finally came true…They…in increasing numbers, asked for 
the money which was supposedly theirs…the banks began to fail and as this still 
further increased the fears of the public, the demands for cash became so great that 
virtually all of the banks had to suspend payments”, (pp.173-174). 
 
While Knight and Simons traced the origins of depressions to expectations and 
velocity, Douglas focused on the disparity between prices and costs and the lack of 
consumer purchasing power.  
 
The former was the result of a rigid downward price structure which reflected the 
prevalent influences of monopoly practices upon the workings of capitalism. According to 
Chicago economists the analysis of monopoly had been forgotten by most economists but 
needed to be re-introduced in order to understand how to deal with the Great Depression. In 
this spirit Douglas wrote (op.cit. p, 234):  
 
“…the orthodox economists, when they portrayed the mechanical adjustments of a 
beautifully adjusted society, were thinking of a freely competitive system. So far as 
business depressions are concerned they went astray in not recognizing the very 
serious extent to which monopoly price policies were preventing the smooth 
functioning which they posited, and were producing internal strains and frictions 
which could only end in disaster and collapse”.  
 
In a similar vein, Viner would still argue three decades later:  “monopoly is so 
prevalent in the markets of the western world today that discussions of the merits of the free 
competitive market…seem to me academic in the only pejorative sense of that adjective.” 
13 
 
Monopoly practices took the form of cartels or pools and agreements between companies to 
increase prices. The stickiness created by private monopoly practices was exacerbated by 
government regulation and eventually by labor’s demands for increasing wages to protect 
its relative income position (Douglas, 1935, p.54; Simons, [1934], 1962). 
 
Douglas fingered management practices as the evil element. As he wrote: “while it 
is evident that at least in the United States high wage rates did not initiate the present 
depression, but that, on the contrary, the pegging of prices by management practices was 
largely responsible for both the initiation and the continuance of the depression.” (p.64)  
                                                                 
13 Quoted in Spiegel (1987).   8 
 
Regarding the lack of consumer purchasing power, he reasoned as follows. The 
increase in profits resulting from the difference between final prices and costs was invested 
in mass production industries increasing in this way their productive capacity. The resulting 
increase in output was not bought at current prices due to lack of purchasing power by 
wages earners and the like. Moreover, the stickiness in prices assumed by Douglas resulted 
in accumulation of inventories of unsold goods. This overproduction translated in a sharp 
reduction in prices, which did away with profit margins, and hence business profits. As he 
put it: 
 
“It will thus be seen how a growth in output, unaccompanied by corresponding 
increases in wages and with heavy reinvestments of the greatly increased profits, 
may cause such an increase of production, that in order for it to be absorbed by the 
smaller incomes, prices will have to be reduced appreciably…profit margins may be 
swept away and a general crisis precipitated. ” (p.74). 
 
The sought remedy to overcome the depression lay in preventing speculation or in changing 
the circulation velocity of money to maintain the prices of final goods stable. More 
precisely, when the prospects for the successful control of the circulation velocity of money 
were dim, a stable relationship had to be maintained between product prices and wages by 
“deliberate action…correcting or offsetting incipient tendencies to expansion or 
contraction.” (Knight, p. 225).  That deliberate action would come from the government. As 
put by Simons ([1934], (1962)), p.55): “ In an economy where costs (especially wages, 
freight rates and monopoly prices in basic industries) are sticky downwards, the deflation 
might continue indefinitely (until everyone was unemployed) if governments did not 
intervene to save the banks or mitigate human suffering.” 
 
  Due both to a fragile financial structure and price and wage rigidity, Simons 
recommended a price index rule whereby currency issue was adjusted in a discretionary 
manner to stabilize the price level.
14 The mode of implementation of this rule was through 
fiscal policy, injecting purchasing power through expenditure and withdrawing it through 
taxation. Monetary policy was too weak both in its institutional structure and in providing a 
stable and measurable “quantity of money” variable. In this respect, Simons ([1936], 
(1962), p. 175) writes:  
 
“…in an adequate scheme for price-level stabilization, the Treasury would be an 
administrative agency; and all the fiscal powers of Congress would be placed behind 
the monetary rule…. At present, monetary powers are dispersed indefinitely, among 
governmental agencies and private institutions, not to mention Congress itself. Since 
the powers of the legislature are ultimate and decisive, a program looking toward 
                                                                 
14 On this basis he rejected a monetary rule. Regarding rules, Simons ([1936], (1962))  wrote: “The liberal 
creed demands the organization of our economic life largely through individual participation in a game with 
definite rules. It call the state to provide a stable framework of rules within which enterprise and competition 
may effectively control and direct the production and distribution of goods” (p.160) and “But we cannot get 
along without some such rules –without some moral sanctions and mandates which politicians must obey in 
matters of finance. And there is probably nothing more promising than the idea of a stable price-level as a 
symbol articulating deep-rooted sentiments and as a source of discipline in fiscal practice” (p.176-177).   9 
co-ordination and concentration of responsibility must focus on fiscal as its mode of 
implementation.” 
   
Douglas (1935) took the same route. He was not convinced of the efficiency of 
monetary instruments to rein in the effects of the depression on output and employment. 
For one thing, open-market operations built up commercial bank reserves and they would 
use these to cancel out debt rather than to end up with bad loans. Also lowering the 
discount rate was simply an “idle gesture” for it would do little to boost business 
confidence since the problem lay in business’ dimmed profit prospects, i.e., in demand 
conditions. Douglas and Aaron (1931) had voiced earlier a similar concern. They also 
pointed out the limitations in the use of monetary policy instruments during a depression: 
“…the difficulty comes form the demand side as to whether business, exposed to such 
difficulties, would wish to borrow more”. The problem was the response of aggregate 
demand. As put by Douglas and Aaron (1931, p. 225): “The interest of society as a whole 
does not lie with the fortunes of individual firms, but in the demand for commodities in the 
aggregate”.
15 
 
  Douglas proposed to separate the function of the creation of credit from the retailing 
of credit by putting the creation of purchasing power into the h ands of the government 
(p.184). The amount of purchasing power to be created would be in direct relation to the 
amount of unemployment (p.189). Under conditions of high unemployment the federal 
banking authority would create credit and loan it to the government “for the financing of 
public works and thus provide the purchasing power needed to put idle labor back to work”. 
Using Kahn’s concept of the multiplier, he estimated that each dollar spent on public works 
would generate an equivalent of 2.80 dollars in the rest of the economy.
16  
 
Ultimately Douglas advocated a budget policy which would be balanced over a ten 
year period but which would allow “…to have receipts exceed expenditures during periods 
of relative prosperity and expenditures exceed receipts d uring periods of depression” 
(p.278). Viner also recommended in 1931 that governments should spend more in 
recessions and decrease taxation during depressions.  
 
  These views were echoed in Douglas & Director (1931) as they argued for an 
activist counter c yclical fiscal policy: “When private business is very active and the 
available supply of labor fully employed, government should contract its own expenditures; 
when on the other hand, private business is depressed, government should expand its own 
expenditures” (p.196). Regarding public works, they wrote: “Our analysis so far, indefinite 
as it is, permits us to conclude that over a period of time it is possible, through the use of 
public expenditures, to reduce somewhat the extreme fluctuations of unemployment. In the 
long run…we may actually expect a reduction in the average level of unemployment” 
(p.219). In their analysis they were aware of the “crowding out effect” but denied its 
relevance: 
                                                                 
15 Mills of Columbia University made a similar statement regarding economic theory: “classical and 
mathematical theory were inadequate to provide a rational program and a technique for the study of the 
economy as a whole” (quoted in Ronnie Phillips, p.28). 
16 Douglas (1935), p. 125.   10 
 
“Credit cannot be looked upon as a fixed pool which is emptied by one if not 
another. Hence to argue that the demand for credit for public works in time of 
expansion acts as a check on private over-expansion, is to disregard the fact that the 
public works industry is itself an important branch of the general construction 
industry…. There is no reason for assuming that contraction of public demand will 
be offset by increase of private demand and that a policy of adjusted public works 
will itself contribute to exaggerate private fluctuations”. (p.221) 
 
   
As a group Chicago economists advocated on more than one occasion an increase in 
aggregate demand to revamp a stagnant economy. In January, 1932, twenty-four 
economists participating at a conference at the University of Chicago urged President 
Hoover to pursue more aggressively open market operations and to continue the 
government’s public works program. Later on in April, 1932, at the request of 
Congressman Samuel B. Pettengil (Republican of Indiana), Chicago economists drafted and 
signed a statement urging a public works program financed by having resort to the printing 
press. As they put it, 
 
“Recovery can be brought about, either by a reduction in costs to a level consistent 
with existing commodity prices, or by injecting enough new purchasing power so 
that much larger production will be profitable at existing costs. The first method is 
conveniently automatic but dreadfully slow…. The second method…only requires a 
courageous fiscal policy on the part of the Central Government” (Quoted in Tavlas, 
(1997), p. 164).
17 
 
Reliance on reflationary policies had an important drawback. They could fuel inflation, 
especially if they were used during the upward phase of the cycle. Simons (1934) was early 
on aware of the link between fiscal policy and inflation, as he labeled reflationary fiscal 
policy as dangerous. Close to two decades after the GT was published, Viner criticized 
Keynes on the grounds that his definition of true inflation was a means to use government 
spending to boost the economy in times of high output and employment.  
It was perhaps the concern that reflationary policies would be used pro cyclically in 
combination with the assumption that full employment was a historical norm rather than a 
historical rarity, that led Chicago economists to eventually abandon the notion of a counter 
cyclical fiscal policy as a fundamental prescription. This, in turn, shifted the analysis of 
compensatory finance from its focus on budgetary aspects to monetary ones. This view was 
fully articulated by Clark Warburton (1896-1979). According t o him, fiscal policy 
combined monetary policy and government expenditures. However, only the former was 
relevant. Government expenditure was simply a substitute for individual expenditure and 
had no extra net effect on the level of activity.
18 Fiscal issues were thus exclusively seen 
                                                                 
17 Simons restated this view ([1934], 1962, p. 74):  “Sound policy will look, first toward pulling the more 
sticky prices down and, second, toward pulling the f lexible prices up, in order to create the favorable 
prospects with respect to business earnings. Little can be accomplished quickly in the first direction; 
consequently, main reliance must be placed on ‘reflationary’ government spending.”  
18 Warburton, op.cit.p.236.   11 
through their monetary aspects and, de facto, encapsulated within the analysis of monetary 
policy.  
 
 
4. Keynes and fiscal policy: from the need of a jolt to capital expenditure stabilization 
In consonance with the early Chicago view, and prior to the elaboration of the GT, 
Keynes advocated public works in times of recession as a means to economic recovery.
 19  
 
His advocacy of public works, from the time of “Does Unemployment Need a 
Drastic Remedy?” (1924) and “Can Lloyd George D o it?” (1929) to the Wicksellian 
framework of the Treatise on Money (1930), sought to provide a palliative measure for the 
practical consequences of laissez faire. This theory made too many stringent assumptions 
(i.e., full employment), or was unable to produce the desired results under market 
imperfections, such as wage rigidity. As put by Keynes (1924), p. 229:  
 
“….we are brought to my heresy…I bring in the State; I abandon laissez-faire, -not 
enthusiastically, not from contempt of that good old doctrine, but because, whether 
we like it or not, the conditions for its success have disappeared…it entrusted the 
public weal to private enterprise unchecked and unaided. Private enterprise is no 
longer unchecked, - it is checked and threatened in many different ways”. 
 
As he moved on towards the GT, Keynes rested his case for public works basically on the 
workings of the multiplier. The idea was to show that, under less than full employment 
conditions, an increase in autonomous expenditures can expand income rather than prices 
(“The Means to Prosperity” (1933) in CW, Vol. IX, (1972), pp.335-366). 
 
With the publication of the GT, Keynes broke away from the concept of fiscal 
policy as a corrective device, as a method to correct economic disequilibrium. Fiscal policy 
became, rather, a way to maintain equilibrium and economic stability. 
 
Following the logic of the GT which separated aggregate demand into income 
dependent and independent categories, consumption and investment respectively, Keynes 
sought to divide the budget into corresponding categories, a current and a capital budget. 
The capital budget included borrowing by the government agencies, surpluses and deficits 
of extra budgetary funds and capital expenditures. The current budget was to be 
                                                                 
19 Keynes's recommendations for public works sounded more original than they really were. Perhaps this is 
due to the lack of an analytical tradition (linking monetary and real variables) akin to that of the United States. 
Following the Napoleonic wars, the quantity theory became embedded in a series of monetary controversies. 
The debate was dominated early on by Ricardo and his followers who, using Say’s Identity, basically 
identified variations in the money supply with changes in prices. The logical culmination to this viewpoint 
was Sir Robert Peel’s Bank Charter Act (1844) which ensured the automatic regulation of the circulating 
media by tying the quantity of Bank of England notes to the amount of precious metals. The quantity of 
money was determined by a specie-price-flow mechanism and this left no place for any type of compensatory 
monetary, or for that matter, fiscal policy. Notwithstanding the temporary suspension of the Bank Charter Act 
in 1847, 1857 and 1866 due to the necessity to restore the stability to financial markets, gold convertibility 
remained the fundamental aim of monetary policy. See, Laidler (1991) and (1999).  Ricardo ([1821], (1951), 
pp. 296-97) allowed, however, for discretionary mechanisms of monetary adjustment such as open market 
operations.   12 
equilibrated or in  surplus to finance the capital budget, which in turn would actively 
maintain an optimal level of capital expenditures (CW, 1980, Vol. XXVII, p.378). Thus the 
capital budget played the main stabilizing role over the economic cycle. 
 
Underlying this view was a key hypothesis of the GT analysis, namely the capital 
non-saturation hypothesis.
20  For Keynes, capital was scarce and this meant that the return 
to increasing investment could always be positive and that investment per-se would 
increase economic welfare. If the investment program were to be turned over to public or 
semi-public bodies this could reduce further its “potential range of fluctuations”. Planning 
was key to maintaining full employment: “With a big program carried out at a properly 
regulated pace we can hope to keep employment good for many years to come. We shall, in 
very fact, have built our New Jerusalem out of the labor which in our former vain folly we 
were keeping unused and unhappy in enforced idleness” (Ibid. p. 270).  
 
Once the capital s aturation point was reached (the point at which investment 
demand could not be brought to equality with full employment savings without engaging in 
wasteful projects) fiscal policy could turn to encourage consumption instead of investment. 
However he saw that stage far in the future: “We most of us, not only expect that we shall 
reach a point where the encouragement of consumption is the thing to put first, but we hope 
for it. All this, however, is in the future.” (Ibid. p. 360). 
 
 
5.  Keynes and fiscal policy before the General Theory 
From late 1924 on, Keynes consistently recommended the undertaking of public works 
as a way to overcome recessions.
21  Underlying this proposition were two key ideas that he 
developed sequentially. First, money wages were rigid and second, unemployment could be 
traced to disequilibrium between investment and savings. Keynes thought that the rigidity 
of money wages was part of the institutional transformation that European economies had 
undergone following WWI. This hypothesis came to the forefront of Keynes’s thinking 
after the return of Britain to the gold standard in April, 1925.
  22 Later on, he used this 
hypothesis to downplay the role that monetary policy could play to turn the tide in a 
depression.
23 His analysis of savings and investment was developed as he worked on the 
Treatise on Money and was clearly enunciated after the ‘Great Slump’ had begun. 
 
In his earlier articles “Does Unemployment Need a Drastic Remedy?” and a “Drastic 
Remedy for Unemployment” (1924) Keynes analyzed unemployment in terms of structural 
causes, wage rigidity and demand considerations. While he thought structural programs, 
                                                                 
20 See Keynes ([1936], 1964), pp.220-221; p. 325 and pp. 375-376. Chick (1992) p.22 refers to it as the most 
basic assumption of the GT. 
21 Earlier on, Keynes did not think that government spending was an efficient way to increase the level of 
output. In an early draft of chapter 3 of the Treatise he stated: “The expenditure, on the production of fixed 
capital, of public money which has been raised by borrowing, can do nothing in itself to improve matters; and 
it may do actual harm if it diverts working capital away from the production of goods in a liquid form.” (CW, 
Vol. XIII, p. 23). 
22 See Keynes CW, Vol. XIII, and (1931). Clark (1988) p. 86. In “The Economic Consequences of Mr. 
Churchill”, Keynes refined his approach to wage rigidity a nd introduced the concept of relative wage 
resistance. 
23 See,  Keynes “The Part Played by the Banking System” (1928-29) in CW, Vol. XIIII, pp.109-110.   13 
reconversion and reorganization of depressed sectors, and wage flexibility could improve 
competitiveness it was  de facto an impractical solution. He thus favored increasing 
aggregate demand through a program of public work expansion. Kahn’s multiplier 
provided, eventually, the basis for its rationale.
24 
 
 Increasing demand could transfer workers from less to more productive sectors. Later 
on, in “How to organize a Wave of Prosperity?” (1928) and in “Can Lloyd George Do it?” 
(1929), he combined the idea of an expansion of demand with that of an increase in labor 
intensity. This increase in labor intensity was an alternative to a decrease in nominal wages 
to reduce production unit costs, thus restoring business profitability. In this sense, his 
thinking was very similar to that of Douglas, Aaron, Simons and Viner. When commenting 
on a money wage reduction as a way to cure the ills of unemployment, he argued (1924, 
p.221): 
 
“Rather we must seek to submerge the rocks in a rising sea, -not forcing labor out of 
what is depressed, but attracting it into what is prosperous; not crushing the blind 
strength of organized labor, but relieving its fears; not abating wages where they are 
high, but raising them where they are low. And there is no way in the world of 
achieving these better alternatives but by confidence and courage in those who set 
enterprises in motion”. 
 
In The Treatise on Money (1930), Keynes made the case for public works for an 
open economy under conditions of wage rigidity and a fixed exchange rate regime. He 
focused on what he thought was the essential problem of monetary theory, the process 
through which the level of prices changes from one situation of equilibrium to another. 
More specifically, the Treatise centered on the dynamic price change, in the short run, and 
its consequences in the level of activity and employment. To this end he used a modified 
version of the quantity theory of money which he termed the ‘Fundamental Equations’. In 
the fundamental equation the price level of output as a whole, p,  was a function of the per 
unit cost of production ((1/e* W), where W is the rate of earnings per unit of human effort 
and e the coefficient of efficiency)
25, and on per unit profits (expressed as the difference 
between investment and savings measured in terms of output, (I-S)/O)),  
 
 
(1) p = (1/e)W + (I-S)/O
26 
                                                                 
24  Having seen a draft of Kahn´s multiplier article, Keynes presented it first in a memorandum to the 
Committee of Economists of the Economic Advisory Council in September, 1930. 
25 Keynes ([1930], 1965), pp. 135-136) called it the rate of earnings per unit of output or the rate of efficiency 
earnings.  
26 Keynes, Ibid., shows the equivalency of the fundamental equations and the quantity theory in the following 
terms. Take Eq. (1) p = (1/e)W + (I-S)/O, and  replace the rate of earnings per unit of output, (1/e)W, with the 
ratio of total money-income (or earnings of the community) divided by output (E/O), 
(4) p = E/O + (I-S)/O, Then assume equilibrium in the investment–savings loci, I=S, Eq. (4) becomes, 
(5) p = E/O  
Since by definition money income (E) equals the product of the money supply (M) times the circulation 
velocity of money (V),  
(6)  p = MV /O or  MV= p O.    14 
 
According to Eq. (1), the price level of output as a whole (p) would equal its cost of 
production when savings equaled investment. Prices and the level of economic activity 
could vary due to changes in the per unit cost of production or due to losses or profits. As 
such an insufficiency of demand (S>I) would generate losses, prices would decrease and 
firms would contract production. The contraction of demand would cause unemployment 
and, under conditions of price flexibility, decreased unitary costs of production. Under rigid 
wages, the contraction in demand could perpetuate itself. 
  Keynes introduced Wicksell’s theory of investment and savings and made the profit 
per unit of output dependent on the disparity between the natural and the market or bank 
rate of interest. In this way fluctuations in the natural or market rate of interest generated a 
disparity between savings and investment (profits or losses) that could contract or expand 
the level of activity. Governmental authorities could vary the bank or market rate to 
approach the natural rate to maintain price and, hence, output stability.  
 
In a depression, savings exceeded investment (i.e., the market rate was greater than 
the natural rate) and thus t he fundamental policy prescription of the Treatise was 
straightforward: an expansionary policy by a demand stimulus that, by decreasing the 
market rate of interest and equating the natural and market rate of interest, would close the 
gap between investment and savings. 
 
  In an open economy under a fixed exchange rate regime such as the gold standard 
the analysis of the Treatise required an extension of the fundamental equations to 
incorporate balance of payments consideration. Within this framework, the price level of 
output as a whole depends on per unit cost and on the difference between national 
investment and savings. National investment equals to the sum of domestic investment (I1) 
and the current account balance (B). National savings equals the sum of domestic savings   
(S1) and foreign lending (L) minus gold outflows (G). Thus, Eq. (1) becomes, 
 
(2) p = (1/e)W + ((I1+ B)-(S1+ L- G))/O 
 
For a given per unit labor cost the equilibrium condition becomes, 
 
(3) I1+B = S1+ L - G  ￿ I1= S1  and  G=0. 
 
Under an open economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, variations in the interest rate 
could not fulfill simultaneously both internal (I1= S 1)  and external equilibrium (G=0) 
conditions.  
 
Starting from a position of full equilibrium an increase in thrift will result in an 
excess of internal savings over investment (I1< S 1) and the market rate of interest will 
exceed the natural rate of interest. A decrease in the market rate of interest to overcome the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
In relation to the fundamental equations Keynes remarks (Ibid. p.138) “they are mere identities; truisms which 
tell us nothing in themselves. In this respect they resemble all other versions of the Quantity Theory of 
Money.” 
   15 
resulting deflation and slump would result in gold outflows (G>0) and foreign exchange 
reserve losses. If the authorities wanted to abate gold outflows they could i ncrease the 
market rate of interest. Whatever the policy options, the results would be similar: price and 
profit deflation would ensue resulting in decreases in output and employment. 
 
  Under these circumstances Keynes thought of two possible remedies: a decrease in 
the per unit cost of production ((1/e)W) or an increase in home investment which would 
restore the natural rate of interest to its previous level. The reduction in unit labor costs 
would decrease further the price level of output as a whole but would restore the balance 
between profits and costs. However, Keynes not only explicitly reiterated his earlier posture 
regarding downward wage rigidity (“ money costs of production show but little resistance 
to an upward movement”  Treatise, p. 165) due to trade union power (p. 347) but also 
argued that it was a dangerous remedy in a capitalistic and democratic society (p. 346) (see 
also CW, Vol XIII, p.360).  Hence his preference to increase investment via loan financed 
public works, calling it ‘my favorite remedy’ (Clarke p. 115).
27  
 
Later on, in “The Means to Prosperity” (1933), Keynes argued for a public works program, 
using essentially the logic of the multiplier. Under less than full employment conditions, an 
increase in autonomous expenditure translated into a higher level of income rather than 
higher prices. Also, the income generated by the expenditure process created the required 
savings to ‘finance’ the initial investment. In this sense, a loan financed program of public 
works need not generate a budget deficit: “...it is a complete mistake to believe that that 
there is a dilemma between schemes for increasing employment and schemes for balancing 
the budget...Quite the contrary. There is no possibility of balancing the budget except by 
increasing the national income, which is much the same thing as increasing employment” 
(CW, IX, p.347). However, it was in this pamphlet that Keynes suggested, perhaps for the 
first time, the use of deficit spending (i.e., the use of budget deficits as a stabilization tool). 
Indeed, he mentioned tax cuts and thus unbalanced budgets as an alternative way to 
increase income.
28 
 
Keynes’s case for demand and output expansion through fiscal policy, in the guise of 
public works, was the basis for his recommendations to the Macmillan Committee, for the 
views presented in “Can Lloyd George Do It?”, and for his earlier views on the ‘Great 
Slump’. In the GT, Keynes did not advocate a systematic policy of loan expenditure public 
works or budget deficits by governments.
29  In fact, as shown earlier and quite to the 
                                                                 
27 In 1931, in his Harris Lectures, Keynes proposed that the United States decrease their rate of interest to 
remedy unemployment rather than carry out a public works program arguing that the country could be 
considered a closed economy. In the Treatise, Keynes neglected the fact that the resulting increase in income 
by increasing imports could affect in a negative way external equilibrium. Roy Harrod (1900-1978) noted this 
flaw in Keynes’s  reasoning. See, Young  (1989). 
28 See CW IX, p. 348 and Clarke (1988), p.290. 
29 Kahn (1984, pp.128-129) identifies only one passage in the GT (Chapter, 10) where Keynes refers to “loan 
expenditure ‘by public authorities’: “ ‘wasteful’ loan expenditure may […] enrich the community on balance. 
Pyramid building, earthquakes…may serve to increase wealth.”  Later on in the GT (Chapter 16) Keynes 
returns to the same idea and focuses this time on ‘digging holes in the ground’ (1936, p.220). Both 
alternatives, building pyramids and digging holes in the ground, refer to activities that are undertaken when 
investments are worth nothing. Under these conditions any alternative is valid and building pyramids has no 
precedence as economic policy tool over digging holes in the ground. Thus in the GT there is really no trace   16 
contrary of what is generally believed, the case for budget deficits is more a product of 
Chicago economics than that of Keynes. Ironically, these policy recommendations became, 
over time, the essence of what was thought to be  “Keynesian economics” i.e., deficit 
spending and, in general, compensatory finance.
30   
 
 
6.  Keynes and fiscal policy following the General Theory  
Following the publication of the GT Keynes fiscal policy stance was derived directly 
from its logic and the views expressed therein.  
 
As mentioned above, the General Theory divided economic categories of final demand 
into two types of expenditures: those related to income (consumption) and those 
independent of income. The expenditures that were independent of income were “linked to 
the amount which it (the community) is expected to devote for new investment” (Davidson, 
1994) and were greatly dependent on expectations.  
 
  In the GT, Keynes demonstrated that the expenditures not related to income, i.e. 
investment, need not equal planned full employment savings. As a result, he recommended  
state intervention to encourage investment. Increasing the scale of investment had clear 
precedence over expanding the level of consumption. As he put it:  
 
“The question then arises why I should prefer rather a heavy scale of investment to 
increasing consumption. My main reason for this is that I do not think we have yet 
reached anything like the point of capital saturation. It would be in the interests of the 
standards of life in the long run if we increased our capital materially. After twenty 
years of large-scale investment I should expect to have changed my mind…” (CW, Vol, 
XXVII, p.350) 
 
His analysis of budget and fiscal policy followed the expenditure category logic of the 
GT: he sought to separate the budget in two components, a current (government 
consumption) and a capital budget (government investment). The capital budget was simply 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
of deficit spending as a policy recommendation. See, Keynes CW, Vol.  XIV, p.58 for an explanation of the 
“digging holes in the ground” policy recommendation. 
30 Compensatory finance was much debated in the 1930’s and was a common policy recommendation. See, 
Keynes ([1933], (1955)); Clark ([1939],(1955)); Lutz ([1938], (1955)); Myrdal ([1939],(1955)); Haley 
([1942],(1955)). However, it has been wrongly identified with Keynes. Williamson (1941) is a case in point. 
In this vein, Harris ([1955], in Lekachman (1964)) wrote: 
“he (Keynes) predicated what later became common knowledge: the government has to spend more 
and tax less in a depression; and spend less and tax more in a peak. These simple truths were Keynes 
discoveries that had to be repeated hundreds of times before they produced the desired impression.” 
 
This has served as the basis for the categorization of economists as ‘keynesians’. Wadill Catchings (1879-
1967) and William Trufaut Foster (1879-1950) are cases in point, not to mention the “unconscious keynesian” 
Marriner Eccles. This tradition has in fact been the source of numerous unnecessary and confusing debates. 
Ohlin (1977) provides a clear example. He mentions that budget deficits and public works were implemented 
in Sweden in 1930 before the publication of the GT. Thus: “My impression is that most of the practical 
conclusions about economic policy under periods of unemployment, which were the outcome of the General 
Theory in 1936…were put forward in Stockholm in the early thirties” (p.161). On these issues see Patinkin 
and Leigh (1977), Garvy (1975), Winch (1966), Patinkin (1982) and Hall (1988).   17 
a survey of capital expenditure to keep it at an optimal level. As he put it: “ a regular survey 
and analysis of the relationship between sources of savings and different types of 
investment and a balance sheet showing how they have been brought into equality for the 
past year, and a forecast of the same for the year to come”.
31 
 
In a situation where the “necessary investment is no longer greater that the indicated 
level of savings and is capable of being adjusted by encouraging useful investment”. 
(p.321) (I.e., when the stock of capital was inadequate or capital was scarce) the capital 
budget could maintain equilibrium and play the fundamental stabilizing role. It could and 
would compensate cyclical fluctuations if two thirds or three quarters of total investment 
would be under public or semi public auspices.
32 This latter idea which had permeated 
Keynes’s mind early on responded to a Burkean ‘query’ regarding the delimitation of the 
state and the individual competencies and responsibilities. 
33 
 
Keynes (1931) conceived of public or semi public corporations whose operating criteria 
were to be found outside the sphere of individual interest. These corporations were to be 
autonomous but subject to the control of parliament and run by technical experts.
34 Later on 
in 1945 as he became an advocate of planning, he decided that the government rather than 
semi public corporations should oversee the functioning of the capital budget. He wrote:  
 
“At one time I had conceived that this (reporting on the present and prospective 
state of the capital budget) should be the task of a semi-independent statutory authority 
to be called the National Investment Board. But with modern developments of policy, 
decisions on such matters have become so much part of the government’s economic 
program as a whole that they should not be dissociated form the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer as the responsible minister and his official department” (CW, Vol. XXVII, 
p.408). 
 
The distinction between a capital and an ordinary budget allowed Keynes to distinguish, 
in turn, between two types of fiscal policy: deficit budgeting (deficit finance) and capital 
budgeting. Deficit budgeting was a means to cure disequilibrium whereas capital budgeting 
“is a method of maintaining equilibrium”. He thus argued against a deficit budgeting 
strategy to smooth out the phases over the economic cycle and, in particular, he opposed 
public works and the use of taxation to affect the level of consumption.
35 Regarding the 
                                                                 
31 Keynes,  CW, Vol. XXVII, p. 368. Though government is present in the GT, it is not a major player and 
does not appear on the same footing as entrepreneurs, speculators or consumers. In this sense, Keynes’s 
analysis of government, contained mostly in his CW, Vol.XXVII, truly marks its incorporation into the 
framework of effective demand. 
32 This proposal has been identified with Keynes’s socialization of investment. However, there are alternative 
interpretations of what Keynes meant by the “socialization of investment.” See, Skildelski (1998) and Ph. 
Arestis & M. Glickman in Sharma (1998). 
33 See Keynes’s The End of Laissez-Faire (1926) and I am a Liberal? (1925) in Essays in Persuasion (1931), 
p.313 and p. 331. 
34 Keynes termed this a return “toward medieval conceptions of separate autonomies” ([1926], (1931), p. 
314). 
35 This was in the context of a proposal by James Meade in 1943 of two types of fiscal stabilizers. The first he 
called an ‘ instantaneous automatic stabilizer’ which consisted of variations in social security contributions 
during the economic cycle which would dampen fluctuations and “prevent the multiplier from doing its evil   18 
former he asserted: “a fluctuating volume of public works at short notice is a clumsy form 
of cure and not likely to be completely successful” (Ibid. p. 319). With regard to the latter 
he argued:   
“In the first place, one has not enough experience to say that short term variations in 
consumption are in fact practicable. People have established standards of life. 
Nothing will upset them more than to be subject to pressure constantly to vary them 
up and down. A remission of taxation on which people could only rely for an 
indefinitely short period might have limited effects in stimulating their 
consumption. And, if it was successful, it would be extraordinarily difficult form the 
political angle to reimpose the taxation again when employment improved.” (Ibid.) 
 
 
For these reasons Keynes opposed the use of the current budget as a way to stabilize the 
cycle. Rather, the current budget should show a surplus, which would be transferred to the 
capital budget. He considered unbalancing the current budget as “a last resort, only to come 
into play if the machinery of capital budgeting had broken down” (Ibid.p.352).
36 
 
  However, these recommendations were valid until the saturation point of investment 
was reached. Beyond this point where, as Keynes indicated, “investment demand is so far 
saturated that it cannot be brought up to the indicated level of savings without embarking 
upon wasteful and unnecessary enterprises” (Ibid. p. 321), savings should be discouraged 
and consumption encouraged by increasing leisure hours, vacation time and shorter work 
hours. While this stage was seen to be far into the future, it would mark the change from 
capital to deficit budgeting as the guiding principle for fiscal policy. 
 
 
 
  .  
7. Conclusion  
During the early 1930’s, Chicago economists and Keynes argued along similar lines 
for a cure for unemployment. They saw it as a question of restoring business profits. They 
both thought that wages were downwardly rigid and in particular Keynes did not 
recommend large cuts in wages on practical grounds (“To attempt it would be to shake the 
social order of its (Britain’s) foundation”  (CW, Vol.XIX, p.360)). As a result, and due to 
the inability of the banking system to ignite a recovery, they recommended that a counter 
cyclical fiscal policy be followed. As Keynes wrote in his letter to President Roosevelt: 
“The object is to start the ball rolling” (([1933], (1955) p.36). 
 
Both used the same framework, the quantity theory of money, though Keynes’s 
version was more elaborate, focusing on the relationship between investment and savings 
and was dubbed “the fundamental equations”. The case for counter cyclical fiscal policy 
was thus built on a combination of the quantity theory of money and a rigid price structure. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
work of exaggeration” (p.318 coll works, Vol. XXVII). The other was the use taxation to counteract 
fluctuations. 
36 Regarding debt management he relegated the use of the term structure of interest rates to a secondary role 
relative to the rationing of the volume of issues  (Ibid. p.397).   19 
A key difference between both is that, where as arguments for deficit spending (i.e., using 
the budget deficit as a stabilization tool) can be found in the writings of Chicago 
economists, this is not the case of Keynes. It is thus ironic that the latter is often considered 
as one of the architects of budget finance when that title belongs rather to the former. 
 
Later, both Chicago economists and Keynes recanted their views on fiscal policy 
but for opposite reasons. The Chicago team emphasized the dangers that a pro cyclical 
fiscal policy might bring about in terms of inflation. Over time, this new view of fiscal 
policy was fully adopted when the view that monopolistic behavior characterized 
capitalism was replaced with the axiom that full employment and perfect competition were 
good analytical approximations to the real world. Ultimately, Chicago economists, 
following the logic of the quantity theory, became preoccupied basically with price stability 
and were not able to build the foundations for an alternative approach to fiscal policy. 
Fiscal issues became subsumed in monetary policy and theory. 
 
Keynes was well aware of inflationary finance but was simply more concerned with 
cost inflation. While demand inflation could be easily brought under control cost inflation 
was harder to eradicate. As he put it (CW Vol. XXVII, p. 417): 
 
“We have been using ‘inflation’ to mean pressure of demand to raise prices above 
current cost of production…But inflation of this sort is a temporary factor,…and 
one we have learned to keep under good control. The real question is the price level 
which is going to be determined by costs of production, internal and external. If the 
costs can’t be controlled, it is futile and dangerous to attempt to exercise any general 
control over the price level.” 
 
His change of vision regarding fiscal policy came about as an intellectual escape 
from the confines of the quantity theory of money and the elaboration of the theory of 
effective demand. Keynes’s new approach to fiscal policy followed the logic of the GT and 
distinguished between a current budget and capital budget just as the GT separated income 
and non-income related categories, i.e., investment. The current budget was to be in balance 
or show a surplus which would be transferred to the capital account. The idea behind the 
separation of a current and a capital budget was not to respond to short term disequilibria 
but to maintain the stability of investment, which was thought to be the “causa causans” of 
the economic system’s behavior. In consistency with this point of view Keynes discouraged 
taxation policies that aimed at tampering with consumption. Consumption habits were far 
too stable to be liable to manipulation by the authorities and taxation policies that aimed at 
consumption were too costly to be implemented. Underlying this view was an essential 
assumption of the GT: capital was scarce and the increment in its stock would yield a 
positive return and would thus benefit society as a whole. In a similar vein, Keynes warned 
about the limitations of a debt management fiscal policy.  
 
As seen through this prism, Keynes’s approach to fiscal policy was an integral part 
of the theoretical framework put forward in the GT. Given a set pattern of consumption 
habits fiscal policy was concerned with maintaining the stability of investment under 
conditions of capital scarcity. This needed above all planning and the elaboration of a long-
term program. Keynes thought this possible for, as he put it,  “In the long run almost   20 
anything is possible”
37. The identification of Keynes with deficit spending as a stabilization 
tool and short run counter cyclical fiscal policy tools have little foundation in Keynes 
earlier writings, and only find a place in his mature works past the stage of capital 
saturation.
38 
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